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Abstract:  Even though important analytical concepts named after Vilfredo Pareto 
were, and still are, employed in public finance theory, Pareto was actually a harsh 
critic of the Italian public finance tradition, especially the classic studies on public 
goods and the reliance on the benefit principle when analysing fiscal activity.  
Instead, he considered the primary feature of the fiscal phenomenon to be the 
redistribution of economic goods resulting from taxes, expenditure and debt, and 
suggested that this phenomenon was more amendable to sociological analysis 
than pure economic analysis.  A largely overlooked aspect of Pareto’s Trattato di 
Sociologia Generale is the discussion of the relationship between social 
equilibrium and long period growth.  This study is an exploratory ‘fiscal 
sociology’ that extends Pareto’s proposition on the relationship between 
economic growth and social equilibrium by developing a range of ‘economic’ and 
‘sociological’ propositions on the long period relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth.  These propositions are investigated with 
reference to Australian fiscal federalism in the twentieth century. 
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Who determines the correct equilibrium between State’s rights and individual 
rights? 




The study of fiscal decentralisation has progressed from theoretical modelling to empirical 
testing of the dynamic relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth.   
From static theory that recognised the local character of sub-nationally provided services, 
such as Oates’ decentralisation theorem (Oates 1972), a strong case has developed for the 
view that fiscal decentralisation enhances efficiency.  Subsequent to this, an expectation has 
emerged that decentralised political and fiscal constitutions will lead to increases in structural 
reform at the regional level that encourages innovation by the various levels of government, 
resulting in enhanced rates of economic growth (Feld, Zimmermann, and Döring 2004).   
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However, empirical studies on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
growth are somewhat equivocal.  Fritz Breuss and Markus Eller (2004) highlight the mixed 
results, which they attribute to: misspecification related to omitted variable bias, problematic 
measurement of fiscal decentralisation; and bi-directional causality.  Their concern with bi-
directional causality suggests that fiscal decentralisation may be more highly related to 
growth for societies with relatively higher per capita incomes because higher per capita 
income is a not only a result of growth, but it also provides the capacity to fund the additional 
costs of public administration associated with greater fiscal decentralisation.  As a 
consequence, the relationship may alter with the economic context of society; with the cost of 
administering a constitutionally and fiscally decentralised system (duplication, lower 
economics of scale) possibly exceeding benefits in the case of relatively low income societies. 
 
A more general issue to consider is whether the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and growth is influenced by the prevailing social state, and vice versa.  
Within the Paretian system, the central issue is whether the social consequences of the fiscal 
framework are mainly economic or sociological.  If the economic effects dominate, fiscal 
decentralisation can be expected to be positively related to economic growth under all social 
states.  However, if sociological effects dominate, then fiscal decentralisation and growth may 
be positively related to economic growth under some social states and negatively related in 
other social states.  This is an issue for fiscal sociology, the sub-discipline that considers the 
relationship between fiscal and social phenomena.  While there are many approaches to fiscal 
sociology (McLure forthcoming), this exploratory study adopts a Paretian perspective where 
the social state is considered with respect to forces that pull society towards a centralised 
‘social equilibrium’ and forces that push society towards a decentralised ‘social equilibrium’. 
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the Pareto’s synthetic notion of ‘social equilibrium’ 
and his proposition on the relationship between growth and social equilibrium.  It notes the 
relationship between fiscal activity and growth specified by Gino Borgatta, a direct follower 
of Pareto, and considers how this can be modified to consider the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation, social equilibrium and economic growth.  Competing hypothetical 
propositions are developed, firstly on the presumption that economic effects are the dominant 
aspect of fiscal events and then on the presumption that sociological effects are dominant.  In 
all cases, the hypothetical propositions are specified with reference to the state of social 
equilibrium.  Section 3 examines fiscal federalism in Australia since Federation (1901).  An 
index of fiscal decentralisation, based on Vo (2005), is estimated for Australia and five 
distinct fiscal periods are identified.  Section 4 is a descriptive investigation of whether prima 
facie evidence from the history of Australian fiscal federalism supports the economic or 
sociological propositions on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth.  The 
results provide tentative support for the view that the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth is influenced by the state of social equilibrium, but, at 
this stage it is unclear whether the dominant relationship is economic or sociological.   
Sections 5 details the way forward for future research by providing a formal specification of 
the relationships economic growth, fiscal decentralisation and the state of social equilibrium 
which will permit researchers to test the economic and sociological propositions against data 
for Australian fiscal federalism.  Section 6 concludes by highlighting the importance of fiscal 
sociology and the need for more research on fiscal decentralisation using this approach. 
 
 
2)  Paretian ‘Social Equilibrium’, Growth and Fiscal Decentralisation  
 
As Pareto’s works, and the Italian fiscal sociology that he inspired, have been of exclusively 
historical interest for more than 50 years, a paper purporting to use the Paretian approach to   3
investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth will no doubt take 
modern public finance scholars by surprise, and may well be received with a considerable 
degree of scepticism.  It is therefore necessary to preface this Section with some general 
observations on why the Paretian approach may still be relevant to studies of the particular 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and growth. 
 
2.1 Current Relevance of the Proposed “Paretian Approach” 
 
The approach taken in this study has contemporary relevance for three main reasons. 
 
First, while the study is ‘Paretian’, it does not rely on Pareto’s analytical instruments.  
Rather, it considers and develops hypothetical propositions that derive directly from the 
Paretian tradition in fiscal sociology.  There is no doubt that the tools of Paretian fiscal 
sociology are outdated, especially when dealing with the impact of specific fiscal decisions.  
In fact, attempts to apply Paretian fiscal sociology to detailed fiscal arrangements achieved 
only limited success, which goes some way to explaining the demise of this approach in Italy 
during the first half of the last century (McLure 2005a).   
 
Second, Pareto’s view of society is particularly relevant to this issue because the 
notions of centralisation and decentralisation in the social state accurately characterise his 
understanding of social dynamics and economic growth.  For example, the sociological 
analysis in the Trattato di Sociologia Generale (Pareto 1916 [1935]) is based on an analogy 
with rational mechanics and observations of social movement are interpreted in terms of a 
stable or unstable ‘social equilibrium’.  Pareto’s application of this sociological analysis to 
contemporary society in Trasformazione della Democrazia (Pareto 1921[1984]) discusses 
movement to new equilibria as a response to the net effect of centrifugal (or decentralising) 
and centripetal (centralising) social forces.
1  When dealing with substantive long run issues 
related to centralisation and decentralisation, the general Paretian approach still appears to 
offer considerable insight, particularly concerning how the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and growth may be influenced by the state of social equilibrium. 
 
Finally, preliminary data are now available to undertake exploratory investigations 
into Paretian hypothetical propositions on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
growth, at least in the case of Australia.  This was not the case when fiscal sociology was in 
its formative years in the early twentieth century. 
 
2.2 Non-logic, Endogenous Preferences and Public Finance 
 
When considering the economic state in a purely static context, Pareto was well satisfied with 
Walrasian general equilibrium.  Indeed, his contributions in that tradition are of great 
historical significance.  However, when considering dynamic issues, particularly economic 
growth and fiscal decisions, he relied extensively on his general sociology, mainly focusing 
on ‘social equilibrium’ or the interdependencies between the economic, political and socio-
behavioural states.  Italian followers of Pareto, most notably Gino Borgatta (1920) and Guido 
Sensini (1932), extended his sociological observations on the relationship between fiscal 
events, social equilibrium and growth into a sub-discipline known as fiscal sociology. 
 
                                                 
1 This is discussed in some detail in McLure (2001, pp. 155-178).  However, it should be noted that this 
interpretation, or more correctly the emphasis to various writings when arriving at this interpretation, is not 
without its critics.  Most notably, Warren Samuels characterized McLure’s work as “Pareto in modern mode” 
(Samuels).  The relative interpretative positions of McLure and Samuels are discussed in McLure (2005b).    4
Perhaps the main reason why Pareto treated dynamic issues in sociological context is 
that he was unwilling to treat sentiment (values, beliefs) as a purely constant influence on 
human conduct in the same objective circumstances.  For conduct related to the political state, 
he regarded subjective intent as interdependent with the objective phenomena: action toward 
an objective goal in response to a particular subjective end modifies the subjective intent, and 
vice-a-versa.  The resulting conduct is not illogical; it is just that the interaction between 
reason and sentiment is a fundamental attribute of human conduct, so utility is endogenous.  
Unlike the modern approach to endogenous preferences, where they are determined subject to 
an overarching concept of inter-temporal logic, the Paretian notion of non-logical conduct 
does not presume logic in social and political choices on issues related to current and future 
costs and benefits.  
 
Consequently, while modern economists may instinctively associate the Paretos’ 
perspective with what is often referred to as Paretian welfare theory
2; this is not how Pareto 
generally approached fiscal and public policy issue.  He criticised many aspects of the Italian 
tradition in public finance
3, especially the extension of analysis of voluntary market exchange 
to involuntary exchange and the notion of “public needs” (expressed by Mazzola, and other 
Italian economists, in a manner consistent with Samuelsonian public goods) because this 
approach did not explain the forces that lead governments to make fiscal decisions.  His 
approach is also inconsistent with the Pigou’s notion of externalities and social returns
4 
because the impact of political and fiscal events on non-logical conduct (endogenous 
preferences) was fundamental to Pareto’s analysis of public policy and his methodology was 




Paretian fiscal sociology eventually emerged as a distinct approach to public finances, 
but one that complemented public economics.  When the presumption of logical conduct 
provided a reasonable approximation to the observed fact, Borgatta, Sensini and others 
applied the orthodox economic approach to fiscal issues.  However, they embraced 
sociological analysis when the assumption of logical conduct was inconsistent with observed 
reality.  This study is undertaken in the same mode.  That is, there is no attempt to reject 
various economic approaches to the study for fiscal decentralisation and growth.  Rather, this 
is an exploratory study to determine whether the sociological approach can add any new 
insights into this relationship. 
 
                                                 
2 The adjective “Paretian” is used with some justification in reference to the first two fundamental welfare 
theorems, and also in discussion of economic criteria used in the Bergson-Samuelson and Arrow social welfare 
functions.   
3 The Italian tradition in public finance is reviewed and assessed in Bellanca (1993). 
4 The approach to welfare economics and public finance advocated by A. C. Pigou, which came to dominate 
much discussion on public policy issues, is quite distinct from the approach to policy analysis advocated by 
Pareto.  Welfare economics is also sometimes called Pigovian, which is appropriate when welfare implications 
are considered in the context of non-paretian notions such as externalities and social returns. 
5 Pareto used comparative statics in economics to investigate what could be (e.g. demonstrating downward 
sloping demand curve and welfare gains from free competition), but he limited this to the case where he regarded 
exogenous preferences as a reasonable approximation to reality, such as the state of economic equilibrium.  
When conduct is non-logical (preferences are endogenous) and analysed as if it were logical, Pareto did not see 
economic analysis of normative possibilities as necessarily representing real alternative real states.  Pareto 
advocated the sociological approach to the treatment of fiscal issues because he regarded the non-logical element 
as dominant in political and fiscal arrangements.   5
2.3 Social Equilibrium and Growth 
 
Pareto’s  Sociologia is a general theory of social equilibrium.  It was constructed on the 
synthetic union of equilibria for three distinct, but related, social states: the economic state; 
the political state; and the socio-behavioural state. 
 
Within this system, the economic state has two elements: a logical element and a non-
logical element.  The logical element is the subject of the pure theory of economic 
equilibrium, which is concerned with market forces associated with a given initial distribution 
of resources.  The non-logical element is the subject of sociological analysis. While Pareto’s 
pure theory of economics provides the first approximation to the economic phenomenon, it is 
a static theory.  General sociology, however, considers the long period implications of 
economic dynamics and variations in the distribution of resources related to purely historical, 
and essentially non-logical, processes.  In particular, in some periods of history, access to 
resources may be dominated by high-risk economic entrepreneurs and workers without secure 
employment but who benefit from high risk economic activity (or ‘speculators’ in Paretian 
terminology); while in other periods of history low-risk entrepreneurs and workers who have 
secure employment (essentially ‘rentiers’ in Paretian terminology
6) may dominate.  The 
variations in their respective access to resources are not fully explained by the marginal 
theory of distribution in light of risk profiles of heterogeneous savers and investors.  To a 




In regard to very long period relationships, the relative control of resources by rentiers 
and speculators is important because changes in the prevailing economic sentiment may 
change activity levels and impact on the potential for economic growth.  In view of this, 
Pareto sometimes divided the economic phenomenon in two parts: ‘the economic part’, for 
when the struggle between speculators and rentiers is benign and conduct is logical; and the 
‘sociological part’, for when the dynamic struggle between rentiers and speculators influences 
the distribution of economic good and conduct is non-logical (Pareto [1918] 1980, p.733). 
 
The political state concerns the balance between individual and collective rights 
associated with the actions of governing elites and their opponents.  This balance is political 
and constitutional in character, but for the purpose of this study it is important to recognize 
that the degree of fiscal decentralisation provides an indicator of the degree of individuality 
accommodated by the political equilibrium.  In this regard, a heavily decentralised fiscal 
constitution will be more conducive to political activity that is responsive to the will of 
individuals than a heavily centralised fiscal constitution, which is more likely to act in favour 
of some perceived collective need.  However, this relationship is constrained by the strategic 
need of political elites to form alliances with the economic elite.  Consequently, even under a 
fiscal decentralized constitution, the political state is likely to be less individualistic (i.e. less 
responsive to public demand) when the economic elite is dominated by low risk rentiers than 
when it is dominated by high risk speculators. 
 
The socio-behavioural state observed in the broader society considers the degree of 
conformity in general social conduct.  More specifically, it considers the balance between 
conformist and non-conformist behaviour relative to the prevailing social precepts in a given 
                                                 
6 Rentiers in this context are not simply ‘savers’.  Savings are borrowed by investors who may have speculator 
attributes (high discount rate, variable income flow, high risk) or rentier attributions (cautious, secure income 
flow, low discount rate, low risk).  Savers may also exhibit speculator and rentier attributes. 
7 Even when the issue of non-logical conduct aside, Pareto still had serious reservations about the marginal 
approach to production theory (Schultz 1929).   6
society at a given time.  This balance reflects the satisfaction that individuals experience from 
different forms of social conduct, which is substantively a reflection of human sentiments 
(which Pareto treated in through his theory of ‘residues’). 
 
All of these social states have a centralisation-decentralisation dimension.  Social 
centralisation is mostly strongly linked to a low risk economic state, a political state that 
emphasises the “collective” need over individuality and a socio-behavioral balance that 
emphasises conformity.  These states are associated with centripetal forces.  Social 
decentralisation is most strongly associated with a high risk economic state, a political state 
that emphasises “individual” needs over the collective and a socio-behavioural balance that 
emphasises diverse, or non-conformist, conduct.  These states are associated with centrifugal 
forces.  Paretian study of social equilibrium is essentially a study of the stability and change 
in the economic, political and socio-behavioral states. 
 
Importantly, at any given point in time, a stable social equilibrium requires the 
economic and political equilibria to be accommodated within the prevailing socio-behavioural 
balance.  Conformists and non-conformists may be persuaded
8 by economic and political 
elites to alter the form of their conduct without threatening the stability of social equilibrium, 
but they are unlikely to make the substantive switch from being a conformist to being a non-
conformist.  Consequently, the Paretian association of the economic and political states with 
the conduct of economic and political ‘elites’ should not be confused with C. Wright Mills’ 
(1956) notion of the ‘power elite’, where social authority is interpreted as laying almost 
entirely within the hands of elite networks, leaving the masses at the mercy of elites.  In 
Paretian social theory, elite authority is always conditional on mass sentiment: there is no 
suggestion that interconnected elites exert unconditional power over the masses.  The phrases 
‘enterprise’ and ‘government and political parties’ could be respectively substituted for 
Pareto’s notion of economic and political elites without doing too much violence to his 
conception. 
 
Over the longer period, Paretian social equilibrium is not stable, it is cyclical.  Social 
movement results in a succession of new political and economic elites that replace the elites 
in demises.  These cycles represent the dynamics by which the economic and political states 
change, with enterprise becoming more or less inclined to risk and political elites more or less 
inclined to support individual or collective need.  The succession of elites changes the social 
and economic states, and the consequent potential for growth, but movement in the socio-
behavioural balance is less susceptible to the influence of volatile cycles. 
 
2.4 Pareto’s Sociological Proposition on Economic Growth 
 
In regard to the relationship between the economic and political states, Pareto tended to 
highlight patron-client relationships.  When the dominant sentiment of the economic state 
emphasised high risk, this tended to be accommodated by the prevailing political sentiment 
through strategic interaction.  On the particular question of economic growth, Pareto argued 
that growth was positively linked to a large portion of speculators in the economic elite (high 
risk investment sentiment) in circumstances where the socio-behavioural balances of the 
working masses are conformist: 
 
                                                 
8 Persuasion can take the form of quasi-logical explanation mixed with sentiment.  Pareto termed such 
explanations as ‘derivations’ because rationalised social propositions derive from sentiment, giving an ethical 
principle or social doctrine the appearance of being established through reason.  Alternatively, persuasion can be 
achieved through the exercise of direct force, such as through criminal codes and consequent punishment.   7
“ … the enormous development of economic production, the spread of civilisation to 
new countries, the remarkable rise in the standard of living among all civilized 
peoples, are in large part the work of speculators.  But they have been able to do that 
work because they came from populations in which class II residues were numerous 
and strong …” 
(Pareto[1916] 1935: 1578)  
 
Speculators are not limited to the financial sector in Pareto’s analysis.  Speculators are 
also members of the economic elite in the real sector who similarly have high discount rates: 
they take large commercial risks and their activities are the source of economic innovation 
and increased productivity.  However, he argues that this only advantages growth when 
significant access to capital by high risk-taking speculators is balanced by a broad population 
mass that has low risk in the form of rentier savers and working masses with conformist views 
because they hold strong sentiments in favour of preserving the economic and social state (i.e. 
class II residues).  Henceforth, this is referred to as “Pareto’s sociological growth 
proposition”. 
 
The presumption here is that adventurous risk takers are economically beneficial to the 
collective when their activities are underwritten by the timid and risk averse who seek 
security in income flows, either through secure investments or secure employment.   
Speculators may lose their money, but more importantly they also lose other people’s money.  
Growth maximising is not achieved automatically, in part because individuals’ risk profiles 
are linked to their personality, so the growth outcome depends on the composition of the 
population.  Moreover, there is no presumption that voluntary decisions maximise growth 
subject to constraints related to the composition of the population and its associated risk 
profile.  This is because non-logic plays a role in the composition of prevailing elites (the 
governing political elite may be relatively collectivist while the alternative may be relatively 
individualist, which may impact on the composition of economic elites).  Non-logical factors 
may also act as a variable influence on individual’s decisions on risk matters. 
 
2.5 Fiscal Decentralisation, Social Equilibrium and Growth 
 
Pareto’s growth proposition was taken up most forcefully in fiscal sociology by Gino 
Borgatta (1920).  He hypothesised a causal link between economic growth and growth in 
public expenditures.  In short, he accepted Pareto’s contention that the basic result of fiscal 
decisions was a redistribution of economic goods, but suggested that the consequent static 
economic welfare loss, or what Pareto and Borgatta referred to as the “destruction of wealth”, 
is more than compensated for by the improved use of capital resulting from fiscal 
redistribution.  In this regard, speculators were presented as the typical net beneficiaries of 
fiscal activity, because they have an above average capacity to avoid tax (or the burden of 
debt when taxes are used to finance debt) and benefit from government related business 
undertaking. 
 
“… the indisputable fact of the great increase in private wealth over the last 150 years 
is indirect, but sufficient, empirical evidence that the destruction of wealth resulting 
from the rise of new governing groups in modern democracies has been compensated, 
and been superseded, by favourable repercussions from factors that create wealth to 
which such movement has undoubtedly contributed.  The most important explanation 
of this fact must be found, it seems, in the economic capabilities of groups in which 
wealth is concentrated as a consequence of fiscal policy and the opportunity this gives 
to their more active, ingenious, resourceful elements, to organise new efforts and 
enterprises, to create large industry, ….”   8
(Borgatta 1920: 97-98) 
 
Borgatta’s position is discussed in some detail in McLure (2004).  For the purpose of 
this study it suffices to recognise that Italian fiscal sociology linked fiscal activity, and 
consequent net benefits for ‘speculators’, to Pareto’s growth proposition.  However, no 
attempt was made to link fiscal decentralisation to Pareto’s growth proposition.  This is, 
perhaps, surprising because the notions of centralisation and decentralisation were important 
elements of Paretian social equilibrium.  The contribution of this study, then, is to develop 
hypothetical propositions on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth from Pareto’s Sociologia and Borgatta’s contention that redistribution for fiscal 
activity largely benefits high risk-taking speculators. 
 
In relation to the question of fiscal decentralisation, the fundamental question is 
whether the economic impact of fiscal redistribution (destruction of wealth) is more than, or 
less than, offset by the sociological impact of fiscal redistribution on economic growth.  If the 
economic impact dominates the sociological, then fiscal decentralisation will lead to less 
destruction of wealth and the potential for economic growth will be greater for all states of 
social equilibria.  However, if the sociological impact dominates, then the relations between 
fiscal decentralisation and growth will vary, depending on the state of social equilibrium. As 
fiscal redistribution is likely to be greatest in a centralised fiscal arrangement due to the 
weaker link between community demands and the responsiveness of governments, economic 
growth and fiscal centralisation will be most significant when the economic state 
characterised by high risk-taking and the socio-behavioural balance is relatively conformist.  
In contrast, fiscal decentralisation will be linked to economic growth when the economic state 
is characterised by low risk, suggesting that the economic goods subject to fiscal 
redistribution may not contribute significantly to economic output, and the socio-behavioural 
balance is non-conformist, suggesting that the community demands for public services is 
diverse.  
 
Consequently, two sets of competing hypothetical propositions emerge: the economic 
proposition and the sociological propositions: These may be summarised as: 
 
Economic proposition (E1):  the long term rate of growth in real per capita GDP 
is greater when fiscal arrangements are decentralised for all states of social 
equilibria. 
 
Sociological proposition (S1): when the prevailing social equilibrium is 
characterised by a ‘high risk’ economic state and a ‘conformist’ socio-
behavioural balance, then long term rate of growth in real per capita GDP is 
greatest when fiscal arrangements are centralised. 
 
Sociological proposition (S2): when the social equilibrium is characterised by a 
low risk economic state and a ‘non-conformist’ socio-behavioural balance, then 
long term rate of growth in real per capita GDP is greatest when fiscal 
arrangements are decentralised. 
 
Sociological proposition (S3):  the long term rate of growth in real per capita 
GDP is greater in sociological proposition 1 (for fiscal centralisation) than in 
sociolological proposition 2 (for fiscal decentralisation) 
 
S1 is predicated on the view that fiscal centralisation strengthens the strategic alliance 
between political and economic elites, increasing potential sociological benefits from fiscal   9
redistribution and Pareto’s sociological growth proposition.  High fiscal decentralisation 
reduces this potential benefit.  In the case of S2, fiscal decentralisation acts as a counter to the 
desire of political elites to emphasise collectivism (because of their alliance with low risk 
economic elites) and, as such, acts as a force to increase political responsiveness to the non-
conformist socio-behavioural state of the masses.  This represents a transmission of the 
masses’ preference for individualism to political elites, increases risk and innovation in the 
activities of governments and their economic enterprises.  It should partially offset the low 
growth attributable to excessively risk averse stance of (non-government) economic elites.  
When the social equilibrium is characterised by low economic risk with non-conformist 
behaviour, fiscal decentralisation will act indirectly on growth.  It makes a bad situation 
better.  In contrast, when fiscal centralisation is associated with a social equilibrium 
characterised by high economic risk and conformist behaviour, the fiscal scheme directly 
complements Pareto’s growth proposition.  It makes a good situation better.  S3 is a 
consequence of this relationship.  
 
The task ahead is twofold: to confirm whether the state of social equilibrium 
significantly influences the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth; 
and if so, to determine whether the above sociological propositions hold, in which case the 
economic effects would be secondary, or whether the economic proposition holds, relegating 
the above sociological propositions to secondary arguments.   
 
 
3)  Fiscal Decentralisation in Australia 
 
The hypothetical propositions outlined in Section 2 must be explored with reference to real 
events for a preliminary understanding of their relevance. This Section presents an index of 
fiscal decentralisation for Australia since 1901-02, the first full year of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (which was established under a federal constitution in 1901), and identifies periods 
of distinct levels of fiscal decentralisation in Australia.  It is intended as a prelude to exploring 
the relevance of the hypothetical propositions outlined above in light of the Australian 
experience (Section 4).  
 
A number of attempts have been made to measure the degree of fiscal decentralisation 
in empirical research (Breuss and Eller 2004).  However, the measures utilised have not 
captured all the key elements reflected in the theoretical literature.  Vo (2005) has investigated 
this issue, and proposed an index of decentralisation that redresses many of the shortcomings 
in existing measures by accounting for the two key attributes of fiscal decentralisation: (i) the 
degree of autonomy that sub-national government have over fiscal matters; and (ii) the 
relative size of sub-national fiscal activity relative to all fiscal activity.  In the Australian 











=   
   +   
 
  FDI:      fiscal decentralisation index 
  OSR:     own  source  revenue 
  OE:     own  expenses/expenditure 
a:   adjustment for factors other than revenue raising powers that 
influence fiscal autonomy  
 subscript  ΣSNG:  sum of all sub-national governments   10
 subscript:  CG:   Central Government 
 
This is effectively the geometric mean of sub-indices for sub-national fiscal autonomy 
and fiscal importance. For the purposes of this study, the above Equation has been revised 
slightly to ensure that the index value is 1 when there is no central government, sub-national 
governments raise all their own revenue and have full fiscal autonomy.  Specifically, the right 
hand side of the Equation has been modified by adding commonwealth own expenditure to 
the denominator of the first bracketed term, so that an index value of 1 corresponds to a fully 
decentralised fiscal system and an index value of 0 indicates a fully centralised fiscal system 
(the Central government controlling all fiscal activity).  In addition, the index is influenced by 
a data limitation.  Specifically, Vo’s index cannot be directly applied to Australia from 1901-
02 because of data limitations relating to local government finances for most of the 20
th 
Century.  As a consequence, the index has been modified to exclude the, relatively small, 
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       ... (1) 
Vo (2005) discusses a range of factors to consider when calculating a, the adjustment 
for factors other than revenue raising powers that influence fiscal autonomy.  However, for 
the purpose of this study, a is limited to the square root untied grants as a share of total grants.  
The presumption being that ‘tied’ grants are the dominant effective means through which the 
Commonwealth Government acts to constrain the autonomy of the states.  Using Equation 
(1), the fiscal decentralisation index for Australia has been calculated in Appendix 1.  This 
information is summarised graphically below in Figure 1. 


















From the fiscal decentralisation index in Figure 1, five periods of Australian fiscal 
decentralisation are of interest: Period A the first quarter of the 20
th century, where the very 
dramatic decline in fiscal decentralisation in the first 10 years of federation slowed in the 
early 1920s; Period B the period from the mid 1920s to the early 1950s when the dramatic 
decline in fiscal decentralisation resumed; Period C the period from the early 1950s to the   11
early 1970s, when the degree of fiscal decentralisation was largely unchanged at around 22%; 
Period D the period from the early 1970s to the early 1990s which is marked by significant 
cyclical fluctuation in the degree of fiscal decentralisation, falling in the mid 1970s to its 
century low of 14%  fiscally decentralised in 1977 and then progressively rising to the post 
World War II high of 31% fiscally decentralised in 1987; and Period E the period from the 
1990s to the early 2000s, when the degree of fiscal decentralisation returned to a new, 
relatively stable, rate of around 26%. 
 
An additional period may need to be added to the above for studies of future data in 
light of the introduction of Australia’s “A New Tax System” from 1 July 2000, which will 
progressively increase fiscal centralisation.  The new system did not notably change fiscal 
decentralisation in 2001-02 because the abolition of state taxes under the new system is to be 
phased in between 2000 and 2005 (e.g. financial institutions duty, debits tax and a range of 
stamp duties).  Also, revenue from the new Goods and Services Tax (GST) is currently 
distributed to the states as an untied Commonwealth grant, resulting in an increase in the 
share of untied grants to the states.
9  If the experience of the 20
th Century provides an 
indication of future events, there is a strong probability that some future Commonwealth 
Government will point to its own budgetary stresses and/or the benefits of ‘national’ social 
reforms as a justification for retaining some GST revenues or for imposing conditions on the 
states’ use of GST revenues.  
 
The dramatic decline in fiscal decentralisation in Period A is associated with a number 
of factors.  Prior to federation, the colonies main revenue source was customs duties.  When 
the Commonwealth of Australia was proclaimed in 1901, the States had some constitutional 
protection.  In particular, the Commonwealth Government was obliged, under Section 87 of 
the Constitution, to return three quarters of customs and excise duties to the states for a period 
of ten years.  Related provisions of the constitution also required the Commonwealth 
Government to pay its surplus revenues to the states.  However, by 1908 the Commonwealth 
passed the Surplus Revenue Act allocating surplus customs and excise revenue to its own trust 
funds to avoid paying the surpluses to the states (Smith 2002, p.296).  The result was that 
within the first 10 years of federalism, states lost access to surplus revenues.  Moreover, the 
requirements of Section 87 lapsed after 10 years, and the Commonwealth Government was 
quickly able to allocate all customs and excise revenue to fund its own purpose expenditures.  
From 1910 to 1927, the process of fiscal centralisation continued, although at a slightly 
reduced rate.  The Commonwealth Government: (i) allocated grants to the states in a manner 
that freed up resources for its own expenditures; and (ii) exercised taxing powers that had 
previously been the preserve of the states.  Grants to the states were being eroded by inflation 
and grew at a slow rate and the Commonwealth introduced land tax in 1910 and income tax in 
1915.  While total government revenue more than doubled between 1909-10 and 1918-19 the 
proportion of revenue accruing to the stated fell by 55% (Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, cited in Dollery 2002, p.13).  While the Commonwealth was able to use these 
arrangements to, among other things, service its World War I related debts, the states were 
unwilling or unable to constrain growth in their outlays in the 1920s, which partially explains 
the reduction in the rate of decline in fiscal decentralisation in the second half of the period.  
The result was a debt crisis which was resolved by the 1927 Financial Agreement when the 
Commonwealth took over the management of most state debt. 
 
In  Period B the Commonwealth Government continued to encourage fiscal 
centralisation.  It introduced the sales tax in 1930, but the biggest single event to reduce the 
                                                 
9 State states do not have the constitutional authority to introduce a GST, as the Australian High Court has 
previously ruling that taxes that affect the price of goods are excises, and the Commonwealth has exclusive 
power to levy customs and excise duty.   12
degree of fiscal decentralisation in Australia’s fiscal history occurred during World War II, 
when the States agreed to vacate the income tax field in 1942 to enable the Commonwealth 
Government to fund its war initiatives. However, this war power has remained ever since, 
with the Commonwealth taxing income and the states refraining from re-entering the income 
tax field.  
 
Period C, from the 1952 to the 1972, was notable for the relative stability of the 
degree of fiscal decentralisation.  On the face of it, this is a little surprising, because in 1971 
the Commonwealth abandoned its payroll tax, and assigned it to the states.  However, this did 
not cause an immediate change because, at the time, payroll tax was a relatively modest tax. It 
also marks the start of increased emphasis on tied grants, which offset much of the increase in 
states’ autonomy from taking over payroll tax. 
 
Period D, from 1972 to 1992, was marked by cyclic change in the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation.  The down phase (or reduction in fiscal decentralisation) in the mid-1970s 
primarily coincided with the first Labor Government (1972-1975) which, after more than 20 
consecutive years of conservative rule, increased its control of expenditure in social policy 
areas, largely through greater use of tied grants to the states.  With the change in 
Commonwealth Government in 1975, the pendulum shifted the other way, not because the 
Commonwealth wanted to make significantly less use of tied grants, but because it reduced 
growth in states’ grants and because the states made greater use of relatively new taxing 
powers, with increases in business franchise fee (introduced in 1973) and their introduction of 
the financial institutions duty (a tax on credits to accounts with financial institutions). 
 
Period E, from 1992 to 2002, is similar to Period C in that the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation also stabilised.  However, the cyclical disturbances observed in Period D had 
the net effect of increasing the degree of fiscal decentralisation associated with the new stable 
state.  Specifically, the cyclical disturbances increased the stable fiscal decentralisation from 
its average of 22% for the period 1952 and 1972 to an average of 26% for the period 1992-
2002.  The stability has been achieved even though the Commonwealth transferred its debits 
tax (a tax on debits to cheque accounts with banks) to the states in 1991, as this increase in 
states fiscal autonomy was largely offset in 1991 when the High Court ruled the states’ 
business franchise fees were unconstitutional (because they were ‘excises’, which, together 
customs duty, are exclusively Commonwealth taxing powers). 
 
 
4)  The Hypothetical Propositions in Light of the Australian Experience 
 
The relationship between real per capita growth and fiscal decentralisation in Australia since 
federation is graphed in Figure 2.  These series have been plotted on the same y axis by 
showing the ratio of current values to the long period average for growth and for fiscal 
decentralisation.  Consequently, a value of 1 for growth indicates that growth is at its long 
period average (of 1.7% for growth in real per capita GDP).  Similarly, a value of 1 for fiscal 
decentralisation indicates that fiscal decentralisation is at its long period average (34%).  The 
long period covers 1901-02 to 2001-02, calculated over 5 year intervals.  A value above 1 for 
either of these series indicates that the series is currently above its long period average and a 
value below 1 indicates that it is currently below the long period average.  The growth rate 
shown on the graph is the average annual growth in real per capita GDP (also calculated over 
the five year intervals).   
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Prima facie, the Australian experience does not support the hypothesis that growth is 
positively related to fiscal decentralisation.  The long period decline in fiscal decentralisation 
is not directly associated with a long period decline in real per capita growth in GDP.  In fact, 
the opposite would appear to be the case, as growth is almost always below its long term 
average when the fiscal decentralisation index is above its long period average.  However, 
care is required when interpreting this descriptive data because fiscal decentralisation will not 
be the only factor to potentially influence growth.  Other influences also need to be accounted 
for.  This study looks for these ‘other’ influences in terms of the hypothetical propositions 
outlined in Section 2 and the key elements of Paretian social equilibrium, especially the 
economic state (degree of risk-taking) and socio-behavioural state (degree of non-conformity 
in mass conduct). 
 
4.1 The Economic State 
 
The degree of risk associated with enterprise is the defining characteristic of the economic 
state.  For this study, the distribution of above mean income is adopted as the indicator of risk 
associated with the economic state on the basis that the lower the dominant sentiment on risk, 
the less variation in the distribution of income.  As is well known, Pareto was a pioneer in the 
study of income distribution, specifying three income distribution functions (Pareto [1896-97] 
1971, pp975-988).  The simplest, which Pareto provisionally accepted as an empirical 






α =  
  x annual  income  value 
Nx  number of people with an annual income that is greater than or equal to x 
  A   estimated parameter  
α  estimated parameter which is indicative of the distribution of income at a 
particular time and across a given population. 
 
There has been considerable controversy about the so called “Pareto’s Law”, or the 
proposition that α is fixed universally.
10  Pareto’s empirical studies found that α was generally 
                                                 
10 A diverse literature on Pareto’s law is collected in volume 3 of Vilfredo Pareto: Critical Assessments (Wood 
and McLure 1999)    14
constant at around 1.5.  This was a controversial conclusion because altering the distribution 
of income would generally alter α, so a fixed α suggested that there was virtually no scope for 
governments to alter the distribution of income to reduce inequality.  While there is no doubt 
that Pareto stressed the empirical regularity of his result, it should be noted that he did not 
treat  α as fixed.  As Tarascio (1973) has highlighted, Pareto’s own discussion on the 
relationship between inequality of income distribution and growth depended on variations to 
α. 
 
In this study, the lower α is, the more homogeneous the distribution of income and the 
lower the presumed risk-taking in economic activities.  Conversely, the higher α is, the greater 
the variation in the distribution of income and the greater the risk-taking in economic 
activities.  However, the Pareto distribution cannot apply to the full range of income 
distribution, as the distribution indicates that as x falls, the need for some minimum level of 
substance suggests that the number of people with an income of x will eventually be greater 
than the number of people with an even lower income of x -1.  Pareto dealt with this issue by 
truncating his distribution at some minimum income level.  However, it is now generally 
agreed that the distribution only holds for incomes well above the minimum level. 
 
In view of this, α for the fiscal periods outlined in Section 2 have been calculated for 
the distribution of above mean incomes (and for the cohort in which mean income is 
categorised).  Income data is from taxation sources, so income is measured as ‘taxable 
personal income’.  The α values have been calculated using the double log version of the 
above Equation, as shown in Equation (2) below: 
 
 log  Nx = log A – α log  x           … (2) 
 
In this form, the –  α indicates the slope of the log distribution function.  The 
distribution becomes steeper as the absolute value |– α | rises, indicating that there is an 
increasing proportion of taxpayers with relatively high incomes.  The distribution becomes 
flatter as the absolute value |– α | falls, which means that there is a reducing proportion of 
individual taxpayers with relatively high incomes.  An above average “α” is taken to indicate 
that the economic state is associated with ‘high’ risk and below average “α” indicates that the 
economic state is associated with ‘low’ risk.  The estimated “α” from Equation 2 for most of 
the fiscal decentralisation periods outlined in section 2 is shown in Table 1.  The “α” values 
for each 5 year interval is shown in Appendix 2.   
 
Table 1: The Economic Balance and Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
(a)    The average “α” for the period 1926-27 to 1951-52 is only based on data 
between 1939-40, 1945-46 and 1951-52.  Data are not available for earlier 
years. 
 
Since  α is estimated for above mean incomes only, the values for α are above the 











A 1901-02  1926-27  n.a.  0.65 
B  1926-27  1951-52             1.87 (a)    0.34 
C 1951-52  1971-72  2.53  0.22 
D 1971-72  1991-92  3.26  0.22 
E 1991-92  2001-02  2.91  0.26 
Average to 2001-02      n.a. 0.34   15
state, the level of risk associated with Australian economic activity has increased until the late 
1980s, it then declined moderately in the 10 years to 2002-03.  
 
4.2  The Socio-behavioural State 
 
In the last 25 years, there have been a range of cross-cultural studies that consider issues 
related to the dual between conformity and non-conformity.  Formative studies in the area 
were undertaken by Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1995).  Hofstede developed a number of 
‘dimensions of culture’, many of which are presented as dualisms such as collectivism-
individualism and masculinity-femininity (an analogy intended to contrast achievement and 
action with nurture and empathy).  Triandis (1995) undertook further studies of the 
collectivism-individualism divide.  However, these studies are intended to emphasise cross 
country comparisons at a particular point in time so that distinct national cultures on 
economic and social progress can be considered. 
 
In this study, however, an historical series of changes in the degree of conformity in one 
country is required.  That is, data must be historical rather than contemporary, and they are 
only required for Australia as there are no cross country cultural comparisons.  Unfortunately, 
no such historical index is currently available, so a provisional index of nonconformist was 
constructed based on the following principles: 
 
1.  The degree of conformist conduct increases with increases in the: 
(a)  enforcement of uniformity in social conduct; 
(b)  declarations of social or institutional commitment; and 
(c)  public provision of social services and services for the ‘national good’. 
2.  The degree of conformist conduct decreases with increases in: 
(a)  share of the population not subscribing to commonly held values or beliefs.  
 
In regard to 1, the combined number of serving military personnel and police offices 
were used to indicate “enforcement of uniformity in social conduct”.  These people not only 
use force to enforce some degree of conformity, they also wear uniforms, which is also a 
symbol of social uniformity.  The rate of marriage per 1000 less the rate of divorce per 1000 
was used to indicate “declaration of social or institutional commitment”.  To the extent that 
net marriage is a social institution, marriage involves some subjugation of individuality by 
both parties.  However, it is a very imperfect indicator.  Association and declaration of 
support with broader community institutions may better emphasise conformity but data on 
individuals association with broad community institutions are not available over the long 
term.  Own purpose outlays by the Commonwealth Government have been unitised as an 
indicator of “public provision of social services and services for the national good”.  This is 
because, in Australia, the Federal Government is responsible for the social security system 
and administering laws and regulations which are designed to protect the national good. 
 
In regard to 2, the number of census respondents per 1000 who declared that they had 
no religious affiliation or refused to declare their affiliation is used to indicate “share of the 
population not subscribing to commonly held values or beliefs”.  There is no doubt that this is 
a partial indicator, as variations in social conformity related to social belief may not be in 
unison with variations in religious belief.  Nevertheless, religion in Australia (at least) acts to 
increase social conformity and should provide a reasonable first approximation.  Census data 
are also available on this issue. 
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To estimate the index of conformist conduct, values for each indicator were 
normalised to 1 for 1900-01, and the index was calculated as the geometric mean of the 
normalised indicator series.  These are summarised in Table 2 for the fiscal periods noted in 
Section 2, although Period A has been left out because there is no data for α.  Details on the 
calculation of the index of conformist conduct are shown in Appendix 3.  
 
Table 2: The Socio-behavioural Balance and Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
The index shows that the degree of conformity of social conduct has varied 
moderately in comparison to variations in the economic state (α) and variations in the fiscal 
decentralisation index itself.  This relatively stability in the socio-behavioural balance is 
consistent with Paretian theory, which predicts greater variability in the economic and 
political states than in the socio-behavioural balance.  However, the degree of conformity 
associated with the socio-behavioural balance is not fixed. In relative terms, the twentieth 
century was associated with a half a cyclical phase: the degree of conformity increased in the 
first half of the twentieth century and fall in the second half of the century. 
 
4.3 The Hypothetical Propositions 
 
To consider the ‘economic’ and ‘sociological’ propositions outlined in Section 2 with 
reference to the Australian experience, it is helpful to render comparable the indicators for the 
economic and socio-behavioural states.  This is again done by focusing on averages, with the 
relative state of a fiscal system if referred to as: ‘decentralised’ when the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation is above the long period average; and ‘centralised’ when it is below the long 
period average.  Similarly, the relative economic state is referred to as ‘high’ risk when the 
degree of risk associated with enterprise is above its long term average and ‘low’ risk it is 
below its long term average.  The relative state of the socio-behavioural balance is referred to 
as ‘conformist’ when the degree of conformity in social conduct is above the long period 
average; and ‘non-conformist’ when the degree of conformity is below the long period 
average.  Again, as no data on α prior are available for Period A, the long period average 
benchmarks for this part of the study have been calculated across Periods B to E inclusive. 
 
The results are summarised in Table 3. The “interaction” column considers the 
compound effect of the economic state and social-behavioural balance suggested by Pareto’s 
growth proposition.  It is labelled relatively “high risk conformist” when the product of “α” 
and “conform” for a given period is above the long period benchmark average product of 
these terms and relatively “low risk non-conformist” then the period product of these 
variables is below the long period benchmark average product.  
                                                 
11 Interaction is represented as “α” multiplied by “conform” in table 3. 























between  “α” 
and “conform” 
(i) (ii) 
B  1927 to 1952  1.37 (b)  0.58  0.78  1.02  0.80 
C  1952 to 1972  0.86(c)  1.53  0.92  1.14  1.04 
D  1972 to 1992  0.88(d)  0.91  1.18  0.97  1.15 
E  1992 to 2002  1.04(c)  1.17  1.06  0.86  0.90 
Average: 1927 to 
2002 
1.00 1.00 1.00(e) 1.00  1.00   17
 




Importantly, the descriptive data in table 3 provide some provisional support for the 
view that the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth is influenced 
by social equilibrium.  This is because fiscal decentralisation is associated with relatively high 
growth and low growth under different social equilibria.  Similarly, fiscal centralisation is 
associated with high and low growth under different social equilibrium.  The result is, of 
course, provisional because the analysis is descriptive only and because of the potential for 
omitted variable bias.   
 
Unfortunately, the results are too fragmented to determine whether the economic 
proposition dominates the sociological propositions, or not.  Periods D and E support the 
economic proposition E1, whereas sociological proposition S1 and S2 have some support 
from periods B and C, at least when considered with reference to the compound effect of 
interaction between “α” and “conform”.  Clearly, the matter will need to be resolved in 




5) Future Research 
 
To determine whether the economic or sociological influences dominate the long period 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth, it is clear that a more 
formal econometric specification of the fundamental relationship is required. 
 
5.1 Specifying the Relationship between Economic Growth and Fiscal Decentralisation  
 
The equation to test this fundamental relationship may take the following form: 
 
g = δ + βln(FDI
*) + γln(α
*) + λln(“conform
*”)     ….  (3) 






















between  “α” 
& “conform” 
(i) x (ii) 
B  1927 to 
1952 
Decentralised  Low  Low risk  Conformist  Low risk 
Non-
conformist 
C  1952 to 
1972 
Centralised High  Low  risk Conformist  High  risk 
Conformist 
D  1972 to 
1992 




E  1992 to 
2002 




conformist   18
 
 
g  growth rate: proportionate change in real per capita GDP 
FDI
*  scaled FDI: 0 < FDI ≤ 2,  FDI µ = 1,  FDI σ = 0.3 
α
*  scaled indicator of economic state: 0 < α ≤ 2,  α µ = 1,  α σ = 0.3 
“conform*”  scaled indicator of socio-behavioural state: 
0 < “conform” ≤ 2,  "" conform µ = 1,  "" conform σ = 0.3 
ln natural  log 
δ, β, γ, λ  parameters to be estimated  
 
 
The scaling of the independent variables in the manner proposed for Equation (3) will 
ensure that their natural log values are positive when the values for the independent variables 
are above mean and negative when they are below mean.  The natural log specification of 
independent variable is also appropriate when the rate of economic growth is the dependent 
variable. 
 
Equation (3) has a number of important properties.  Firstly, the parameter δ equates to 
the real per capita rate of growth in GDP when all the dependent variables are at their mean 
value.   That is, the long term average growth rate given an average state of social equilibrium 




each have a mean value of 1, resulting in βln(FDI
*) + γln(α
*) + λln(“conform
*”) summing to 
zero. 
 
5.2 Testing the Economic and Sociological Propositions 
 
To test the economic proposition E1, data over the course of the Australian federation should 
be used to undertake regression analysis based on Equation (3).  E1 will require a positive and 
significant parameter for β, with no expectation concerning the sign of γ and λ positive. 
 
If EI is supported and the results show that β is positive but α
* and “conform
*”are not 
significant, the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth would 
contrary to the Paretian position, be independent of the state of social equilibrium.  This is not 
an expected outcome, but in such as case Equation (3) could be re-estimated to improve the 
accuracy of estimates of β by replacing indicators of the social state (α
* and “conform
*”) with 
a range of economic ratios, which would also need to be scaled such that  i µ = 1,  i σ = 0.3.  
Examples include investment as a share of GDP, international trade as a share of GDP, and / 
or lagged expenditure on education as a share of lagged GDP. 
 
To test for the three sociological propositions, the data set will need to be divided into 
two subsets: (i) when the social equilibrium is relatively “high risk and conformist”, defined 
by the requirement that the period product of “α” and “conform” be above the long term 
average product of these terms; and (ii) when the social equilibrium is relatively “low risk and 
non-conformist”, defined by the requirement that the period product of “α” and “conform” be 
equal to or below the long term average.  Given the scaling of independent variable in 
Equation (3), the product of “α” and “conform” will be greater than one for the relatively 
“high risk and conformist” case and less than or equal to one for the relatively “low risk and 
non-conformist” case. 
 
Equation (3) should then be estimated separately for the two data subsets of data.  For 
sociological proposition S1 to hold, the β should be negative and γ and λ should be positive   19
for data in subset 1.   For sociological proposition S2 to hold, β should be positive and γ and λ 
should be negative for data in subset 2.  For sociological proposition S3 to hold, the estimated 
growth rate from data subset 1 should be greater than the estimated growth rate for subset 2. 
 
The author is currently collecting annual data to undertake the above analysis, but the 
hypothetical sociological propositions can be illustrated through a purely ‘notional’ numeric 
example, such as that represented by Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Notional Numeric Illustration of Sociological Propositions 
 
 
Cases 1 and 2 relate to data subset 1.  Cases 3 and 4 relate to data subset 2.  When the 
notional index and parameter values for subset 1 shown in Table 4 are introduced into 
Equation (3), and the long term average growth in real per capita GDP given the average state 
of social equilibrium (δ) is assumed to be 2%, the estimated value of g is: 3.0% in case 1 and 
2.0% in case 2.  This would support sociological proposition S1.  When the notional index 
and parameter values for subset 2 shown in Table 4 are introduced into Equation (3) and (δ) is 
again assumed to be 2%, the estimated value of g is: 2.3% in case 3 and 2.8% in case 4.  This 
would support sociological proposition S2.  As notional growth under case 1 is notionally 





The Australian experience with fiscal federalism provides some provisional support for the 
Paretian view that the state of social equilibrium impact on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth.  This suggests that fiscal sociology may provide a 
basis for the study of the relationship between the fiscal constitution and economic growth. 
 
However, the descriptive investigation of twentieth century fiscal federalism in 
Australia has failed to establish whether economic or sociological effects have dominated the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth.  More research, of the type 
advocated in Section 5, is required before this important question can be properly considered. 
 
Description 
Notional Values for Scaled Indices and 
Parameters 
Case  FDI*  α* “conform*” FDI* α* “conform*”
1 Centralised  High  risk  Conformist 0.75 1.25  1.25
2 Decentralised  High  risk Conformist 1.25 1.25  1.25
3 Centralised  Low  risk  Non-conformist 0.75 0.75  0.75
4 Decentralised  Low  risk  Non-conformist 1.25 0.75  0.75
Subset 
1  β  γ  λ -0.02 0.01 0.01
Subset 
2  β  γ  λ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01  20
Appendix 1: Provisional Fiscal Decentralisation Index for in Australia 


























































  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii)  (xiii) 
                   
1902  15 56  41 58  15  1.00  23 8  66  64  0.62 0.90  0.75 
1907  16 45  30 63  16  1.00  26 10 73 55  0.41  1.13  0.68 
1912  12 83  71 82  12  1.00  41  29 111 112 0.64  0.73  0.68 
1917  12 102 90 106 12 1.00  68  56 162 158 0.56  0.67  0.61 
1922  14 170  156 175 14 1.00  127 128 303 283 0.51  0.62  0.56 
1927  16 222  206 222 16 1.00  152 146 368 358 0.56  0.62  0.59 
1932  24 199  175 242  4 0.41  143 143 385 318 0.19  0.76  0.38 
1937  30 236  206 238  4 0.37  166 162 400 372 0.19  0.64  0.35 
1942  28 305  277 299  4 0.38  420 420 719 697 0.15  0.43  0.25 
1947  128 346  218 350  254 1.41  863 863  1213  1081 0.25  0.32  0.29 
1952  324 777  453 783  240 0.86  2034 2034 2817 2487  0.14  0.31  0.21 
1957  488 1154 666 1168 348  0.84  2624 2624 3792 3290  0.15  0.36  0.23 
1962  852 1609 757 1617 609  0.85  3283 3283 4900 4040  0.13  0.40  0.23 
1967  1183 2286  1103 2286 827  0.84  5228 5228 7514 6331  0.12  0.36  0.21 
1972  2395 4035  1640 4050  1441  0.78  8688 8688  12738  10328  0.10  0.39  0.20 
1977  7648 9796  2148 9790  3696  0.70  21436 21436 31226 23584  0.05  0.42  0.14 
1982  13153 19742 6589 19799 6936  0.73  40593 40593 60392 47182  0.08  0.42  0.18 
1987  20738 48747  28009 54787  13843  0.82  73567 76361  131148  101576  0.17  0.54  0.31 
1992  25701 58701  33000 62458  15201  0.77  93982 105565 168023 126982  0.15  0.49  0.27 
1997  31188 74686  43498 70812  17492  0.75  129845 135126 205938 173343  0.16  0.41  0.25 
2002  50752 106702 55950 104140 33000  0.81  189759 193406 297546 245709  0.15  0.42  0.25 
Data: Australian Bureau of Statistics: (i) Year Books from 1901(ii) catalogue 5512.0 
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Appendix 2: The Economic State 
α  R
2 
Before 1940  n.a.  n.a/ 
1940 2.05  0.9959 
1946 2.32  0.9974 
1951 2.10  0.9920 
1956 2.18  0.9705 
1961 2.65  0.9979 
1966 2.87  0.9995 
1971 2.86  0.9917 
1976 3.25  0.9985 
1981 3.48  0.9960 
1986 3.35  0.9940 
1991 3.37  0.9962 
1996 2.75  0.9916 
2001 2.61  0.9941 
Average 2.76  - 
Data: (i)  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Books from 1940 
    (ii)  Australian  Taxation  Office:  Taxation Statistics (1990-91, 1997-98, 2000-01) 
Appendix 3: The Socio-Behavioural Balance 





















































 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) (ix) 
1901  7.26 9.13  117.3  2.4% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
1906  7.34 6.78  129.5  2.8% 1.01 0.74 1.10 0.85  0.92 
1911  8.75 7.30  183.3  3.3% 1.21 0.80 1.56 0.73  1.02 
1916  8.05 18.31 324.6  2.8% 1.11 2.00 2.77 0.86  1.52 
1921  8.35 26.37 641.9  2.4% 1.15 2.89 5.47 1.00  2.06 
1926  7.76 11.04 615.2  5.3% 1.07 1.21 5.24 0.46  1.33 
1931  5.78 7.65  778.1  13.1% 0.80 0.84 6.63 0.18  0.95 
1936  8.21 8.15  727.3  12.7% 1.13 0.89 6.20 0.19  1.04 
1941  10.04 48.65  1533.9  11.8% 1.38 5.33 13.07 0.20  2.11 
1946  9.26 14.97  1823.3  11.4% 1.28 1.64 15.54 0.21  1.62 
1951  8.21 9.91  2830.8  10.7% 1.13 1.08 24.13 0.22  1.61 
1956  6.82 15.87  2594.9  10.0% 0.94 1.74 22.11 0.24  1.72 
1961  6.57 9.14  2487.6  11.1% 0.90 1.00 21.20 0.22  1.43 
1966  7.36 10.60  3133.3  11.1% 1.01 1.16 26.70 0.22  1.61 
1971  7.93 10.45  3710.1  12.9% 1.09 1.14 31.62 0.19  1.65 
1976  3.31 8.25  4522.5  18.2% 0.46 0.90 38.54 0.13  1.20 
1981  4.82 8.54  5081.3  22.2% 0.66 0.93 43.31 0.11  1.31 
1986  4.68 8.08  6247.9  25.1% 0.64 0.88 53.25 0.10  1.31 
1991  5.68 8.23  6430.7  23.4% 0.78 0.90 54.81 0.10  1.41 
1996  2.93 6.30  7385.8  25.6% 0.40 0.69 62.95 0.09  1.13 
2001  50752 106702  55950  27.2% 0.34 0.63 72.52 0.09  1.08 
Data: (a) McDonald, Ruzicka and Pyne (1987) and Australian Bureau of Statistics Year Books from 1901; (b) 
McKernan (1987), Mukherjee (1987) and Australian Bureau of Statistics Year Books; (c) Australian Bureau of 
Statistics: Year Books from 1901 and Catalogue 5512.0; and (d) Phillips (1987) and Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Year Books from 1901.  
 
Caveat: the data entered in Appendices 1, 2 and 3 and the growth data used in the text are provisional - they need 
to be checked.  Check with the author to determine whether the data have been updated.   22
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